The events of 514–510 offered a perfect maze from which to tease out vice or virtue according to taste and purpose. Who freed Athens? The blameless young heroes, Harmodios and Aristogeiton, or the Alkmeonidai with the Spartans? Were the young heroes blameless or just erotically miffed? Were the Alkmeonidai supported by Apollo's will or Apollo's venality? Thucydides is better evidence for the existence of the arguments than for the facts behind them. But whatever the facts there was something here for every taste, intrigue in high places, violence, sex in many shapes. Small wonder that with Spartan alliance as part of his plot and the Akropolis as his setting, Aristophanes should exploit what lay to hand. The hint at 59/60 and the firm allusion at 231 are followed by a stream of titbits about tyrants, tyrannicides, Alkmeonidai and Spartans (vv. 271–80; 616–25; 630–35; 667–9; 1150–56) not forgetting a makeweight in Athens' aid to Sparta at 1137–48. All natural enough.

There may, however, be more to it. Between *Lysistrata* and earlier plays I sense a shift, both qualitative and quantitative, in allusions to Athens' past. Contrast the vagueness of the old men in *Acharnians* (vv. 179–81) or *Wasps* (vv. 235–8) with the precision, however unreliable, here. I renew a suggestion made in *GRBS* 10 (1969), 277–86 (cf. *Phoenix*, 17 (1963), 160ff.) that some work of 'scholarship' had come to Aristophanes' attention and that that work might have been part of what later became Hellanikos' *Atthis*. For me, following Jacoby,[5] Hellanikos was in the Athenian democratic tradition; Sparta always needed foreign aid; Athens could solve its own problems. Hence Kimon's glorious mission to Messenia (1137ff.; contrast Thuc. 1.102), hence emphasis on the tyrannicides at the expense of Sparta and the Alkmeonids: 231 (I believe), 621 (perhaps, see n. 5), 630ff., 665ff. (perhaps); contrast Hdt. 5.55–65, Thuc. 6.53ff. Other Aristophanic oddities, notably the curious role of the old men at Leipsydrion, could be welded into a Hellanikan story, but it would scarcely be profitable to create it.

Better to conclude with a sort of parallel. The role of the monarchy in this country has been discussed for some time; recent activities of the royal family occasioned rumour and more debate; it was the appearance of Andrew Morton's book which added a pretence of scholarly accuracy. Hellanikos could well have given a lecture or two on Hippias, Aristogeiton—and Leaina, the girl who kissed but would not tell.

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A TRIREME FOR HIRE (IS. 11.48)

In the extensive cast of characters named in Isaeus' *On the Estate of Hagnias* are two brothers, Chaereleos and Macartatus. The speaker, their brother-in-law, is anxious to impress upon the members of the court that neither was a rich man. 'You are all my witnesses,' he asserts, 'that ... they were not in the class of those who perform liturgies but rather of those who possess a modest estate.' Chaereleos on his death left land worth no more than 3000 drachmas. Macartatus left nothing at all. 'For you know,' the speaker reminds his audience, 'that he sold his land, bought a trireme, manned it, and sailed off to Crete, (you know it) because it was by no means a covert

act—indeed, it furnished a topic for discussion in the Assembly, namely that he might cause a state of war instead of peace between us and the Spartans.... It turned out... that he died along with this property of his that he sailed off with. For he lost everything, both the trireme and his life, in the war'. (Is. 11.48–9)

There are two vital questions whose answers the audience presumably knew but we can only guess at. The first is: where did a man of such limited means get the money to buy a trireme? If he was not rich enough to undertake liturgies, he was worth less than three talents[1]—perhaps much less: his brother's property was valued at around half a talent, and his could well have been the same. The hull of a new trireme cost a good deal more than 5000 drachmas,[2] its gear over 4000,[3] the bronze alone of its ram over 500.[4] He doubtless bought everything secondhand, but, even so, the total could easily have come to two talents or better. Then we must add the cost of the

[1] Cf. J. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford, 1971), pp. xxiii–xxiv.

[2] Aristotle reports (*Ath. Pol.* 22.29–38) that the 100 triremes built at Themistocles' insistence cost, presumably fully equipped, 100 talents. Figures that are chronologically closer can be found in Athens' naval records, for these run from *c.* 377 to 322 B.C., and the speech against Hagnias is generally dated to *c.* 359 (R. Wevers, *Isaeus: Chronology, Prosopography, and Social History* [The Hague, 1969], pp. 19–20). A number of entries list trierarchs who, after a court's decision that they had unjustifiably returned their ships in unfit condition, agreed 'to return a new ship, dismantle the old, and return the ram to the shipyard' (*IG* ii² 1623.6–13, 26–34, 113–23; the bronze ram, impervious to damage that might destroy the wood of a hull, was a vital and costly fitting and hence well worth removing and reusing). Other entries make clear that such trierarchs absolved their obligation of supplying a new ship by paying the sum of 5000 dr. (ii² 1629.478–83, 494–9, 569–77 [half payment of 2500], 585–99 [one instalment of 1500, another of 3500], 600–612 [two instalments of 2500]). The 5000 dr. may have been a standard rounded figure adopted for administrative convenience rather than the actual cost of replacement; cf. V. Gabrielsen, *Classica et Mediaevalia* 39 (1988), 66–70. The actual cost was no doubt considerably higher, because to the 5000 dr. we must add the value of the hull that was returned and dismantled, presumably so that the shipyard could cannibalize the timber. How much of an increase this represents we have no idea, but it very likely was considerable; cf. W. Kohler in *Athen. Mitt.* 4 (1879), 81–2.

[3] The naval records list cash payments by trierarchs for items of gear issued to them that they for some reason failed to return to the shipyard, including in many cases a complete set. The sums listed for the complete sets show a wide variation. The highest is 4863 dr., 2 ob. (*IG* ii² 1631.538–42). There are two instances of 4100 dr. (ii² 1631.444–8, 462–6) and a third at least that high (ii² 1631.544–8). The commonest figure is 2169 dr. (ii² 1624.42–9, 50–56, 57–62, 63–70, 71–7, 87–92, 98–101, and cf. 93–7, where the amount listed [723 dr.] looks like an instalment payment of one-third; 1629.667–73, 674–83 [2 instalments of 1084 dr., 3 ob.]). Next common is 2299 dr. (ii² 1629.486–93, 577–84, 707–14). And there are sums that run the gamut in between: 2372 dr., 3 ob. (ii² 1631.457–62), 2642 dr., 4 ob. (1631.470–73), 2940 dr. (1631.448–52), at least 3100 dr. (1631.474–8), 3216 dr., 4 ob. (1631.466–70), 3291 dr., 4 ob. (1631.453–7). The preciseness of the figures indicates that an exact evaluation of all gear was kept. Their variation may reflect the condition of the gear: i.e. the frequent figure of 2169 dr. may reflect sets that had suffered a predetermined standard amount of use, the very high figures sets that were in mint or near mint condition.

[4] That the 5000 dr. paid by trierarchs for a new hull (n. 3, above) did not include the cost of the ram is made clear by entries in which trierarchs, known from other entries to have paid up their 5000 dr., are listed as still owing the ram. Thus, Callias, trierarch of the trireme *Strategis* built by Aleximachus, who in ii² 1629.478–83 is credited with having paid in his 5000 dr., in 1629.830–3 is listed as still owing the ram; there are similar entries for Niceratus, trierarch of the *Symmachia* built by Hagnodemus (ii² 1629.494–9 and 834–6), and for Conon, trierarch of the *Demokratia* built by Chaerestratus (1629.600–612 and 839–40). The figure of 500 dr. for the bronze of a trireme's ram is based on an ingenious analysis by W. Murray (*GRBS* 26 [1985], 141–50) of entries recording the sale of damaged rams; he estimates the amount of bronze a ram required as *c.* 8½ talents (p. 149) and its cost as *c.* 61 dr. per talent (p. 150).

crew, at least 3000 drachmas a month and quite possibly double that[5]—and, since his destination was Crete, he surely had to reckon on using the ship that long.[6]

The second question is: what was his purpose? Almost all commentators, drawing the conclusion that seems to follow most naturally from the few facts the speaker offers, think that he went to the aid of some Cretan city or cities at war with Sparta;[7] a few think that he may have gone to the aid of a city that was in conflict with another and that Sparta was sufficiently involved in Cretan affairs to take a hostile view of any Athenian interference.[8] Many go further and link the answers to the two questions. Macartatus, they suggest, was also planning to be a privateer and was backed by a consortium (ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι) looking to gain from the booty he would take.[9]

A serious objection to this solution of the problem is the total absence of any support for it in Isaeus' words; there is not even a hint there that booty played any part in Macartatus' plans. Indeed, Isaeus' words all but rule it out. They report that Macartatus made it to his destination—universally agreed to be a Cretan city under attack—that he engaged in battle there, and that he went down with his ship. Why in the world would people looking for profit from freebooting have put their money in a trireme embarking on such an enterprise? A trireme that, on its way out, could go after prizes only incidentally and that, on arrival, would plunge into combat with the triremes of the Spartan navy? There were far more attractive ventures available to them. In a speech by Demosthenes dating to the very time we are dealing with, a trierarch asserts that some of his fellow trierarchs, for a fee of no great amount, hire out their trierarchies[10] and the hirers, with the ships so acquired, 'plunder and pillage

[5] From the time of the Peloponnesian War onward, the pay for an experienced oarsman was at a minimum 3 obols a day (e.g. Thuc. 8.45.2), often double that (e.g. Thuc. 6.31.3, 8.29.1), and sometimes in between (e.g. in 407 B.C. it was suggested to Cyrus the Younger that he pay 1 dr. a day; he countered with 3 ob. a day but then, on Lysander's plea, raised it to 4; Xen., *HG* 1.5.4–7). Cf. W. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, I (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 14–24; Gomme, *HCT* on 8.45.2.

[6] From Piraeus to Eraklion is 175 n.m. The outbound voyage, for which the Aegean summer northerlies would be favourable and permit a speed of *c*. 5 knots (cf. L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*[2] [Princeton, 1986], p. 288), would take at least three days (triremes normally travelled only during the day, putting in to shore at night) and a day or two more, if Macartatus' destination was on the island's south coast. The return, done against the wind, would take three or four times as long (Casson, pp. 289–91). The travel alone, in other words, would consume almost two weeks.

[7] G. Schömann, ed., *Isaei Orationes XI* (Greifswald, 1831), p. 476; W. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus* (Cambridge, 1904), p. 712; K. Münscher in *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechts-wissenschaft* 37 (1920), 311; K. Fiehn, *RE* s.v. 'Makartatos' (1928); P. Roussel, *Isée, Discours*[2] (Paris, 1960), p. 204; W. Thompson, *De Hagniae Hereditate* (Leyden, 1976), p. 56. Athens was at peace with Sparta from 386–79 and 369–62 B.C., so the incident must have taken place in one of these periods. The commentators listed above prefer the earlier date (also Davies in his biographical notice of Macartatus [n. 1 above, p. 85]) except Thompson; as he cogently points out, the speaker's claim that all in his audience are his witnesses to Macartatus' modest circumstances (ἐμοὶ δὲ μάρτυρές ἐστε πάντες) and that they are aware of how he died, makes better sense if the matters involved are of relatively recent date rather than twenty or more years in the past.

[8] See H. van Effenterre, *La Crète et le monde grec* (Paris, 1948), p. 81, n. 3. Sparta certainly is found mixing into Cretan affairs a few decades later: in 343 Archidamus came to the aid of Lyctus when it had been seized by Cnossus (Diod. 16.62.4) and ten years after that Agis launched a full-scale assault upon the island (Diod. 17.48.1).

[9] See Schömann 476; Wyse 712; Fiehn 632; Thompson 56–7 (opp. cit., n. 7). E. Forster in the Loeb edition (1927) refers (p. 387) to Macartatus' venture without qualification as 'a privateering enterprise'.

[10] Dem. 51.7–9; cf. B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period*, University of California Publications: Classical Studies 13 (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 79–80. In Dem. 51.11 a fee of

everybody', and that this abuse is so rampant that the Athenians alone were unable 'to go about without a flag of truce because of the seizing of (Athenian) people and property in reprisal provoked by these (sc. hirers of trierarchies)'.[11] The language may be overheated, but we cannot doubt that the abuse existed, and one of these triremes would have been an infinitely better investment than Macartatus'.

How then was he funded? We must look to his objective for the answer: he must have been paid by those to whose aid he was going. And he must have been paid well, enough to cover his high start-up expenses and to make it worth his while to risk not only his entire fortune but, as it turned out, his life. Macartatus, in a word, was a naval condottiere: he offered for sale a fully equipped, fully manned naval unit, just as contemporaries of his, such as Charidemus,[12] offered a fully equipped, fully trained military unit.[13]

Why did his act create such a furore? There must have been something seemingly official about what he did to arouse discussion in the Assembly, to raise fears that Sparta could make it a *casus belli*.[14] The answer, I suggest, is connected with the answer to a question that has so far never been raised: from whom did Macartatus buy the ship?

He could, theoretically, have got it from any navy with a craft available for sale. But the speaker's words to the effect that his purchase and departure were common knowledge clearly imply that the locale was Athens. It follows that he bought the ship from the Athenian navy—which, in any event, was the most convenient source. We know from the naval records that it was regular practice for the Navy Board to sell off gear judged to be no longer serviceable.[15] There doubtless were hulls of older ships that fell in this category. No sales of any are attested, but that is hardly

30 minas is cited; to this, of course, must be added the cost of the trierarchy, but this could be held to a minimum by the use of gear and rowers furnished by the state (cf. 51.5–6).

[11] Dem. 51.13; cf. H. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (Liverpool, 1924), p. 117. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*,[2] iii.1 (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 242–3, dates Dem. 51 around 359 B.C.   [12] Dem. 23.148: ξεναγῶν ... καί τινων ἀρχων στρατιωτῶν.

[13] Thompson suggests (n. 7 above, p. 57) that Macartatus may have been subsidized by 'Cretan friends'; whether friends or strangers paid the money, the purpose was the same: the hiring of a naval unit. The closest parallels to Macartatus' act are furnished by the pirate leaders (ἀρχιπειραταί) who hire out themselves and the vessels under their command to some state. E.g. Demetrius, during his siege of Rhodes, took into his service an ἀρχιπειρατής named Timocles with his flotilla of three aphracts, i.e. fast undecked warcraft (Diod. 20.97.5–6).

[14] In 396 B.C. Demaenetus, an Athenian commander, without the knowledge of the Assembly but with the secret approval of the Boulê, sailed off with a state ship to join Conon, then admiral of the Persian fleet; an uproar arose about the danger from Sparta's reaction to such a provocative move, and the Assembly met and disavowed the action (*Hell. Oxy.* vi.1–3 Bartoletti). E. Meyer (*Theopomps Hellenika* [Halle, 1909], p. 43) considers Macartatus' foray analogous, that he too was a state agent carrying out a covert state action, and this view has received some approval (see Grenfell and Hunt's note to *P. Oxy.* 842.i 3; Roussel [n. 7, above] p. 205). But Macartatus' foray as presented by the speaker had nothing to do with the state: it was a private venture involving the use of a privately owned warship (cf. I. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* [Cambridge, 1967], p. 51; Davies [n. 1 above], p. 85). Meyer tries to forestall objections raised on this score by asserting that the purchase of the trireme 'ist offenbar eine Form gewesen...: der Rat überlässt dem Privatmann durch einen Scheinkauf eine alte Triere'. This is sheer speculation; there is nothing whatever in Isaeus' words, nor any historical parallel, to support it.

[15] *IG* ii[2] 1629.1133–62 (repeated in 1631.326–43) lists a series of items disposed of, and the funds received for them, during the archonship of Anticles (325/4 B.C.). They included: heavy cables from 25 triremes, other rope, one type of screen from 11 triremes and another type from 2 quadriremes, oars, rams (sold as scrap; see Murray [n. 4 above]), bags for sealing the oarports, braided cord, caulking tow, and several other items.

surprising: there would be precious few customers for a trireme, a type of vessel that had no use other than as an engine of war. But if a customer did turn up, we may safely assume that the Board would leap at the chance to pocket some unexpected cash. If we further assume that Macartatus got his trireme in this way, we have a reasonable explanation of why his private act took on an official cast. Although he was an individual operating for his own account a warship that was his own property, appearances would by no means reveal this; indeed they would give the opposite impression. When he went into battle, how were his antagonists to know that the ship bearing down on them, a trireme like any other in the Athenian navy, was commanded by an adventurer out to make a profit and not by a trierarch operating under orders from the Athenian state?[16]

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[16] During the Peloponnesian War the Athenian warships, lightly built in order to carry out tactics that demanded speed and manoeuvrability, were easily distinguished from the heavier units of their opponents; see J. Morrison and R. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 281–2, 313, 317–20. This doubtless was true of the fourth century as well.

A NOTE ON POLYBIUS 24.14.8–9

In 180 B.C., in response to a treaty-breaking incursion into Galatia and a threat to Cappadocia, Eumenes of Pergamum marched against Pharnaces of Pontus. The route he took is described thus by Polybius (24.14.8–9):

παραγενόμενοι δ' ἐκ Καλπίτου πεμπταῖοι πρὸς τὸν Ἅλυν ποταμὸν ἑκταῖοι πάλιν ἀνέζευξαν εἰς Παρνασσόν. ἔνθα καὶ Ἀριαράθης ὁ τῶν Καππαδοκῶν βασιλεὺς συνέμιξεν αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως, καὶ (παρεισ)ῆλθον εἰς τὴν Μωκισσέων χώραν.[1]

It is the purpose of this note to suggest a replacement for the conjecture Μωκισσέων, which has inhabited nearly all texts of Polybius for more than two hundred years. The suggestion I have to make arises out of my study of the episcopal geography of western Cappadocia in the time of St. Basil, but in the course of researching the history of the Polybian text I have discovered that my conclusion was anticipated in the mid-eighteenth century, although apparently ignored by Polybian scholars since then.

Μωκισσέων first entered the text as the suggestion of John Jacob Reiske in 1763.[2] He was disagreeing with the decision of the editor of the *editio princeps*,[3] Fulvius Ursinus, who, 'pro Καμισέων, quod fuit in eius codice, reposuit Ἀμισέων'. This was absurd, Reiske argued, since Ursinus had already removed Parnassus from the text and replaced it with Amasea. Thus, Ursinus had Eumenes marching from Amasea to the territory of Amasea. Reiske's justification for Μωκισσέων was its occurrence as a metropolis of Cappadocia in all the episcopal notitiae. Ursinus' 1581 edition was based on copies made in the Escorial in 1574 by Andreas Darmarius of what was at that time the sole surviving manuscript of Constantine Porphyrogenitus' *De Legationibus*. This original manuscript and the first copy were both destroyed in a fire at the Escorial in 1671 but other versions in Darmarius' hand survive. Büttner-Wobst

[1] The text is quoted from the Teubner edition of Th. Büttner-Wobst, (Leipzig, 1904), Vol. IV, p. 171.
[2] *Animadversionum ad Graecos Auctores* (Leipzig, 1763), Vol. IV, p. 681.
[3] *Ex libris Polybii Megalopolitani selecta de legationibus, ex bibliotheca Fulvii Ursini* (Antwerp, 1582).